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AUDI ALTERAM PARTEM
It is a firmly established rule of common law that a judge or anyone exercising
a judicial function must hear both sides of every case: not only the plaintiff or
prosecutor, but also the defendant must be heard. This rule is recognized in
England as one of fundamental 1 justice, and a failure to observe it makes the
whole proceeding defective and voidable; in the United States of America the
principle is part of the notion of "due process" and is equally well protected.
"A person's right to . . . an opportunity to be heard in his defense . . . [is]
basic in our system of jurisprudence," said Justice Black in In re Oliver.2
In England the rule is often said to spring from the idea of "natural justice," 3
and thus ranks alongside the rule that no one may be a judge in his own cause.
English judges, however, are slow to decide cases by reference only to philosophical concepts, and much prefer to rely on precedent. One might, then,
have expected to be able to trace the English decisions on the rule called audi
alteram partem back through a series of precedents to one ancient, seminal case
in which, exceptionally, the rule is developed from first principles; yet the
fact is that, in the two oldest English cases which mention the rule, sources
are cited which belong not to abstract philosophy, but to the worlds of pagan and
Christian Latin literature, and thus ultimately to Greek and Roman antiquity.
It may accordingly be instructive, both for its own sake and for that of
demonstrating an unusual source for a common law rule, to examine the
standing of the idea audi alteram partem in the Greek and Roman worlds.
On reading the many classical texts which contain a reference to this idea
one is struck by the curious dichotomy of purpose behind the principle. The
common law, as has been said, tends to think of audi alteram partem as essentially a rule of natural justice; the classical world thought of it in two ways,
both as a rule of justice and as a rule of wisdom. Of course these two notions,
justice and wisdom, border on each other and indeed overlap to some extent;
both imply a correct decision, but the idea of wisdom seems to concentrate on
the quality of mind of the person who produces the correct decision; justice
suggests rather the effect of a correct decision seen from the point of view of
those affected by it. It is only the latter element which underlies the modem
common law understanding of audi alteram partem; one hears both sides of a
case, because if one does not it is unfair to the party unheard. In the Greek and
Roman worlds, on the other hand, not only this notion appears, but also the
idea that one ought to hear both sides of a case, because otherwise one may
make a mistake.
Thus in classical Greece one finds, on the one hand, Demosthenes' statement
1. The word "fundamental" is used by Esher, M. R., in Hopkins v. Smethwick Local Board
of Health, 24Q.B.D. 712, 716 (1890).
2. 333 U.S. 257, 273 (1948).
3.
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that the Athenian judicial oath (attributed doubtfully to Solon) contained a
promise by every judge to listen equally to prosecutor and defendant (Ka&
v) 4 ; and
&KpOdo-o.La TO1) rE Kan71yOpov Kal 1"on 4iroXoyovJ4E'vov 6oo cs so~
in other passages we learn from him that even apart from this oath the ordinary
enjoined an equal hearing to both sides.5 Demosthenes
&6po&)
laws of Athens (ov
adds an interesting piece of psychology: Solon saw that human beings enjoy
hearing an accusation more than a defense, and therefore realized that a defendant, speaking after his accuser, could be protected from an incorrect judgment only if the judge showed an equal degree of attention to both parties
(7rapcw-XAwv awov

10roV Ka& KOLVOV

afAoTE'pot aKpoar'v). Here the idea of au-

di alteram partem is shading somewhat into the idea of judicial impartiality.
A generation earlier, two characters in Aristophanes' Wasps reproduce the conflict between the ideal of justice, that both sides should be heard, and the ideal
of convenience, that the second party need not be heard if the matter is clear
enough already:
Bdelycleon:

IIp69 isV OEv, 11 7TpOKaTayiYVWO-K',
1rp~v av y',aotrq &IVor4 pow.

Philocleon:
To

1rpaypa bavEpbv &o- v

0

7T'p,

'AXX', ZoyaOE',
av6ro yap f8oC. 6

And a generation after Demosthenes we find Menander7 writing a little sententia whose inspiration seems to be justice: Punish no one unexamined
('AvcE'Tao-i-ov A71 KokaNCe p-&va). Many Greek (as well as Roman) writers
regard the condemnation of someone without trial as being tyrannical, unjust and
illegal, 8 and Thucydides assimilates a sentence passed without trial to a sentence
passed on an unheard defendant when he writes of the execution by the Athenians of a captured Spartan delegation untried and unheard (dcKpLovT Ka.
OI-Lv a EIVrEv).q
fiovXojfvov
On the other hand there are classical Greek references to the idea of audi
alteram partem where it is seen as a maxim of popular wisdom, morally almost
as empty of content as our "look before you leap." Euripides in the Heraclidae
makes the chorus say:

T'

dv 8&icnv KpLvE"'9 -/
"yvo[ X6Yov,
rrp&v dv irap"eLp6ov IAOov 9KILdO cracs;10

And in his Andromache exactly the same note (wisdom or cleverness rather than

4.

"I will give impartial hearing to prosecutor and defendant alike."

5.

De Corona 1. 6-7.

6.

In Timocr. 149-151.

Bdelycleon: "Come, don't decide against us, pray don't, father, before you've heard
both sides."
Philocleon: "But, my dear boy, the thing's self-evident, speaks for itself." 919ff.
7. Fragm. 17.
8. As to this, see my article Demokratie und Strafverfahren in der klassischen Literatur, due
to appear shortly in a volume of essays in honor of the late Professor V. Arangio-Ruiz.
9. THucyDmIs, HiST O
2. 67: "unjudged and although wishing to say something."
10. "Who would judge a dispute or decide a matter before getting a clear statement from
both sides?" 179-81. See also the following verses.
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justice) is struck when Orestes, congratulating himself on having listened to
reports from his rival Neoptolemus, says:
100,1T& yJf7l

Xyovs

dKov EW

TOyD

8

tdtavToq

Thw &avTkov

86porov'

7rapa.11

Aristophanes, again in the Wasps,1 2 gives us the idea in the form of a proverb
(in which form it was also known in the Roman world) :13
wof 3 oo~o' iv 6&rnt fKUTKKVaxOr,
oVK av 8tKaraT.

'H1

Ilpiv dv

ciiqoolv p5J~ov

"It was a wise man who said: Don't give your judgment before you've heard
what both sides have to say." What is at work in these texts, particularly in
the last one, is not the lawyer's "Hear both sides, otherwise you will be doing
an injustice"; it is the cautious countryman's "Hear both sides, otherwise you
are likely to make a fool of yourself."14
This notion in turn reflects a kind of pride in giving a correct judgment
and adds a dimension of verisimilitude to the famous trial scene depicted on
the shield of Achilles in the eighteenth book of the Iliad.'5 Here the elders sit
in a "sacred circle" around the contestants, and eagerly give their judgments
in turn; before them lie two talents of gold to be given as a reward to "that one
among them who would utter the straightest judgment" (' PEr- TOLO' 8t7-qv
(Both the parties in this lawsuit - which probably reflects
Witv-ai-a
0rot).16
the conditions of the second millennium B.C. - are heard by the elders before
the judgments are given.)
The same division between wisdom and justice in the foundation of the rule
audi alteram partem can be traced in the Roman sources, though here, as is
not surprising considering the Roman legal genius, the latter motive predominates
very heavily.
The maxim audi alteram partern does not occur at all in the Digest of

11. "Wise was the rede of him who taught that men should hear the reasonings of the
other side." 957ff.
12. 723f.
13. See Cicero, ad Atticum 7. 18. 4; infra, notes 24 and 25.
14. Other Greek texts which might be mentioned are: Pseudo-Plato, Demodocus 383a, in
which the practice of hearing the other side is discussed in the light of both of justice and
of wisdom: "For it is right and just also to give a hearing to the defendant and to what he
has to say in defense and rebuttal; the same holds true of the plaintiff. For it is impossible to
hear and judge a man by fair standards unless both parties to a litigation have been heard."
(AlKaLop U eiJai IcaL 7-0 droo7o0Xo-/oV u dKOVCat 1rpo ro
rat(ipL J peugaGOat, Wtrrep Kai To
5paro,
H@s -y&p av r7Si
B IK17P KaXeS 5LKdoat J dvOp62To V KaT& rp61rov KpaL
a
dVr7L8tcw
dxoiuas) Also Lucian, "About Not Believing Calumny Too
cited in THEODORETUS, ECCLESIASTICAL HISTORY 1. 33.

car,-7yopoOiv-os.
IA d/loo79pwyp

Easily,"
15. 497ff.
16. The exact meaning of the text has been hotly controverted in the past; the interpretation given here accords with H. Sidgwick in 8 CLASSICAL REVIEW Iff. (1894), and with
ERIK WOLF, 1 GRIECHISCHEs REcHTSDENKEN 89 (1950). In spite of serious difficulties it
seems on the whole the most plausible.
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Justinian, and one has to search very hard to find even a hint of the notion in
specifically legal texts;17 but this may be at least partly because the idea was
familiar and taken for granted. The secular writers, on the other hand, make
the principle explicit. Thus the elder Seneca, in a controversia, makes an accused person, prevented by a magistrate from making a speech, complain that
even those accused of treachery to the state are given a hearing before being
executed (cum nec proditores inauditi pereant).18 Tacitus reports an attempt

to have the notorious informer Crispus condemned unheard; those who resisted
this course thought that an accused ought to be heard according to the customary
law (more audiendum) no matter how guilty and detested he might be. 19
Suetonius, in one of many references in literature to the one-sidedness of the
justice of the Emperor Claudius, tells of an advocate who cravenly thanked
Claudius for allowing an accused man to make his defense, but added (under
his breath, one supposes) : et tamen fieri solet ("but of course it is the custom") .20
Apuleius gives a picture of magistrates who try to save an old man from being
lynched; what the magistrates suggest is ut rite et more maiorum iudicio reddito
et utrimquesecus allegationibus examinatis, civiliter sententia promeretur, nec
ad instar barbaricae feritatis vel tyrannicae impotentiae damnaretur aliquis
inauditus et in pace placida tam dirum saeculo proderetur exemplum. Placuit
salubre consilium ....
21 To hear both sides, plaintiff or prosecutor and de-

fendant, was thus clearly part of the Roman mos maiorum, and where the
principle was neglected, where men were condemned unheard, the Roman
lay writers reacted invariably with disapproval. 22 Many Roman texts can be
cited which, without specifically saying that audi alteram partem is a rule of
law, yet make it clear that its neglect is wrongful. 23
On the other hand, the notion of audi alteram partem as a maxim of mere
wisdom is not entirely lacking in the Roman texts. Thus Cicero, writing to
Atticus, says his brother Quintus has complained to him that he is being hard
pressed by Atticus for payment of a debt; Cicero, however, refrains from reproaching Atticus, because he has not heard Atticus's side of the story:
Ego

17.

autem, etsi illud qv8qo'&68,Eov -

ita enim

putatur -

See, e.g., DIOESTA 48. 8. 2:Inauditum filium pater occidere non potest.

.

observo,

. ("A father

may not kill a son without a hearing").
18.

Controversia exc. 6. 10.

19.

HiSTORIA 2. 10.

20. DE VITA CARSARUM V (Divus Claudius) 15.
21. "to proceed by examination of witnesses on both sides, like good citizens, and with
order of justice according to the ancient custom; for the giving of any hasty sentence or
judgment without hearing of the contrary part, such as the barbarous and cruel tyrants are
accustomed to use, would give an ill example in time of peace to their successors. This safe
opinion succeeded..." Met. 10. 6.

22.

The Romans, too, associated the ideas of indemnatus (one punished without a proper

trial) and inauditus (one condemned unheard). As to indemnatus, see my article mentioned
supra, note 8.
23. Seneca, Medea, 199-200; Apocoloc. 10.4; 12. 3. 19; 14. 2; Pliny, epistulae 4. 11. 6;
Suetonius, Claudius 38, Galba 14, Vitellius 14; Tacitus, Dialogus de Oratoribus 16; Historia 1. 6; Annales 2. 77; 12. 22; Curtius Rufus, Historic Alexandri Magni 6. 10; 8. 7;
Justinus, epistula Pompeii Trog. 22. 3. 7; Symmachus, rel. 34. 10; Avitus, carmina 6. 605.
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/.L1 8

" S'cv,

24

praesertim in te, a quo nihil umquam vidi temere fieri, tamen

illius querela movebar. Hoc quidquid est, te scire volui.25

What is interesting here is the reference of t-q& S'Kqv to wisdom rather than
to justice; when Cicero says he does not want to offend the principle, he adds
"least of all in your case, Atticus, by whom I never saw anything being done
rashly" (not "unjustly"). Tacitus, in writing incredulously of the rumor that
Tiberius had connived at the poisoning of his son Drusus, say quis enim mediocri
prudentia, nedum Tiberius tantis rebus exercitus, inaudito filio exitium offerret?

("for what man of even moderate wisdom, not to speak of Tiberius, who was
experienced in such great affairs, would force death upon his son without hearing
his defence?")26 Here again, unwisdom rather than injustice is the uppermost
idea.2 7
Side by side with the notion of audi alteram partem as a rule of justice,
its conception as a saw or maxim of popular wisdom seems to have lasted into
the Middle Ages. In the great hall of the Rathaus in Niirnberg there appears
the inscription "Eins manms red ist eine halbe red, man soll die teyl verh6ren
bed"; in the front hall of the Rbmer in Frankfurt-am-Main there is a similar
inscription: "Eyns mans redde ein halbe redde, man sal sie billich verhiren
bede," and the portrait of the Emperor Lothar (died 1137) in the R~mer carries
the motto "audi alteram partem," because he was accustomed to say "Mit Urteil
sprechen gar nicht eile, bis du geh5rt hast beide Teile." 28 All these rusticsounding German maxims give the impression of being inspired by a desire
for wisdom as much as for justice.
It is extremely probable that many of the Greek and Roman texts which
refer to the principle of audi alteram partem as a rule of justice were known
to the English lawyers of the Renaissance; 2 9 at any rate, it is interesting to find
that, in the earliest English case which deals with the point, 3 0 the authority cited
for the proposition that justice required both sides to be heard is a couplet
from the Medea 3 ' of Seneca:
24. IA18& 8IKnv [8&KdV
rpl as .AJoolV UDOOVdKot6o0]: see Ernst L. Leutsch and F. G.
Schneidewin, Paroem. grace. II. 759. It is interesting to find a Roman barrister relying
on a Greek maxim of this kind; Cicero was fond of using Greek expressions, but surely
in this context he would have used a Roman tag, had one existed.
25. "Still, I will observe the saying, falsely ascribed to Hesiod, 'Hear both sides,' particularly in the case of yourself, whom I have never known to do anything rash. But I was
affected by his grievance. I wanted you to know about it, such as it is." Ad Atticum
7. 18. 4.
26. Annales 4. 11.
27. See perhaps also Pliny, epistulae 10. 59, a letter to Trajan in which he refers to the
emperor a document containing the other side of a case. His purpose is to make it easy for
Trajan to decide (Quo facilius v.elut
audita utraque parte dispiceres quid statuendum
putares). The quality of the judicial function rather than the goodness of the result is in
the foreground.
28. All this information is to be found, with further references, in GEORG BiCHMANN,
GEFLUGELTE WORTE 387 (18th ed., 1895).
29. Seneca was well known in 16th-century England. Shakespeare, who may have read him
at school, mentions him in Hamlet II. ii. 419.
30. Boswel's Case, 6 Co. Rep. 48b, 52, 77 Eng. Rep. 326, 331 (K.B. 1606).
31. 199-200.
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Qui statuit aliquid parte inaudita altera 3 2
Aequum licet statuerit, haud aequus fuit.
The idea of audi alteram partem seen explicitly as a rule of natural justice

goes back to the late Latin of the Fathers of the Church. Christian polemic
seems to have enlisted the principle of audi alteram partem, found so profusely
in lay literature, as has been shown, in aid of the Christian faith, which tended
to be "condemned unheard" by contemporary paganism. Thus Tertullian wrote:
Respondendi, altercandi facultas patet, quando nec liceat indefensos et
inauditos omnino damnari. Sed Christianis solis nihil permittitur loqui,
quod causam purget, quod veritatem defendat, quod iudicem non faciat
iniustum. Sed illud solum expectatur quod odio publico necessarium est,
confessio nominis, non examinatio criminis.... 33
The reason for pagan unwillingness to hear the proofs of the Christian faith
Tertullian finds in the pagans' suspicion that, if they did once listen to the
other side they would be unable to condemn it (because they would be converted) :
Quid hic deperit legibus in suo regno dominantibus, si audiatur? Ad hoc
magis gloriabitur potestas eorum, quo etiam auditam damnabunt veritatem?
Ceterum inauditum si damnent, praeter invidiam iniquitatis etiam suspicionem
merebuntur 34
alicuius conscientiae, nolentes audire quod auditum damnare
non possunt.

The same thought is found in Lactantius in his title De Justitia:
Ab hoc tamen, si fieri potest, humanitatis jure postulamus, ut non prius
damnet, quam universa cognoverit. Nam si sacrilegis, et proditoribus, et
veneficis potestas defendendi sui datur, nec praedamnari quemquam incognita causa licet: non iniuste petere videmur. .

si audierint, damnare non possint. 35

.

. Sed . . . verentur, ne

It will be noticed that here for the first time we find the principle audi alteram
partem given some kind of philosophical basis: Lactantius calls it a ius
32. "Who judges, one side unheard, although he judges justly, has not been at all just."
33. "There is open opportunity of reply and debate, as it is not lawful to condemn in any
way the undefended and the unheard. To Christians alone it is not permitted to speak
what will cleanse the charge, what will defend the truth, what will make the judge just;
but what is sought is only what public hatred demands, the confession of the name, not the
examination of the charge." Apologia 2. 2.
34. "How will it harm the laws, secure in their domain, if there is a hearing? Will not
their power be glorified so much the more when they condemn the truth after hearing? But
if they condemn the unheard, in addition to the odium of an unjust deed they well deserve
the suspicion of doing it with a sense of guilt, not having wanted to hear what they could
not condemn if they heard." Apologia 1. 3.
35. "We demand this, if it is possible, by the right of humanity that he not condemn before
he knows everything. And if this right of defense is given to the sacrilegious, and to traitors,
and to poisoners, and it is not lawful to condemn anyone in advance before his case be tried,
we do not appear to ask unjustly. . . . But they are fearful that if they hear, they cannot

condemn." Divin. inst. 5. 1. (de non damnandis reis, inaudita causa, etc.) (MIGNE, PATROLOOSA LATINA vol. 6, col. 546f.).
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humanitatis. But the fullest and most compelling statement of the rule is found
in the writing of the fourth century bishop Lucifer of Cagliari in Sardinia, in
his defense of St. Athanasius. The passage deserves to be cited at length:
Cogis nos, Constanti, absentem damnare consacerdotem nostrum religiosum
Athanasium: sed divina id facere prohibemur lege: impellis auctoritate latius
regali Domini sacerdotes ad effundendum cruorem, ignorans jura justitiae,
tradita nobis divinitus, te conatum ex nostris auferre mentibus. An divinitus
poteris asserere permissum, absentem, inauditum, et quod est maximum,
innocentem damnari? Quomodo etenim arbitraris divinitus permissum, puniri
inauditos, quando videas Adam et Evam principes nostri generis auditos
sententia percussos Dei? "Et vocavit Deus Adam, et dixit ei: Adam, ubi es?
et dixit, Vocem tuam audivi, Domine, in paradiso, et timui, quia nudus sum,
et abscondi me. Et dixit illi
Deus: Quis tibi indicavit, quia nudus es, nisi de
ligno de quo praeceperam tibi, de hoc solo ne manducares, ex eo manducasti?
Et dixit Adam: Mulier quam dedisti, ipsa mihi dedit de ligno, et manducavi.
Et dixit Deus mulieri: Quid hoc fecisti? Et dixit mulier: Serpens persuasit
mihi, et manducavi. . . . Abel interficitur justus, et interrogatus Cain sumit
sententiam; et tu Domini inauditum vis puniri sacerdotem? . . . Numquid

non licuerat Deo, priusquam Cain convocaret atque interrogaret, punire?
sed noluit; dans formam, quo genere inciperemus judicare commissos nobis....
Igitur si judicium Dei antistitum tam decet esse justum, quod Dei esse dicatur
judicio terminatum, quomodo tu inauditum jubebas damnari a nobis? . ..
Si populus idcirco ad nos confluit, ut secundum Dei legem judicetur, cur
tu inquies, Damnate innocentem? 3 6
This seems to be the first trace of the idea that the principle of audi alteram
partem originates in divine example and is therefore inherently entitled to
obedience from human beings. This view may have been a commonplace in the
Christian world, as is suggested by the unexpected reappearance, 1400 years
later, of exactly the same quaint reasoning in the other early English case on
the rule, that of Dr. Bentley in 1723,37 in which Justice Fortescue said:
36.

"You compel us, Constans, to condemn our pious fellow priest Athanasius.

But we are

prohibited from doing this by divine law. By the sweeping use of royal authority you ask
the priests of the Lord to shed blood; ignorant of the laws of justice, divinely given to us,
you try to take them from our minds. By what divine right can you assert that it is permissible to condemn one who is absent, unheard, and, above all innocent?

How do you be-

lieve it divinely permitted to punish a person unheard when you see that Adam and Eve,
the origin of our race, were heard before they were struck by the sentence of God?

'Then

God called Adam and said to him, Adam, where are you? And Adam said, I heard your
voice, Lord, in paradise, and I was afraid, because I am naked, and I hid myself. And God
said to him, Who showed you that you are naked, except that you have eaten from the tree
from which alone I commanded not to eat? And Adam said, The woman that you gave
me, she gave me from the tree, and I ate. And God said to the woman, Why did you do
this? And the woman said, The serpent persuaded me, and I ate. . . .' Abel a just man
was killed, and Cain having been questioned, received his sentence.

And you wish to punish

a priest of the Lord without a hearing? . . . Was it not lawful for God to punish Cain
before he called him and questioned him? But He did not want to, giving a model by
which we might begin to judge those committed to us. . . . Therefore if the judgment of
God's bishops ought to be so just that it may be said to be the judgment of God, how can
you order that someone be condemned by us unheard? . . . If the people, then, come to
us to be judged according to the law of God, why do you ask, Condemn the innocent?" Pro
S. Athan. 1. 1 (MIGNE, PATROLOGIA LATINA Vo1. 13, col. 817ff.).
37. The King v. The Chancellor, Masters and Scholars of the University of Cambridge,
1 Str. 557, 567, 93 Eng. Rep. 698, 704 (1723).
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The laws of God and man both give the party an opportunity to make his
defence, if he has any. I remember to have heard it observed by a very
learned man, upon such an occasion, that even God himself did not pass
sentence upon Adam before he was called upon to make his defence. "Adam,
says God, where art thou? Hast thou not eaten of the tree whereof I commanded thee3 8 that thou shouldest not eat?" And the same question was put
to Eve also.

It is certain that, inasmuch as the rule audi alteram partem does in fact
represent an idea of instinctual or natural justice, it must have a place in the
heart of every human judge, independently of precedent or authority; yet that
equally strong English legal instinct, to search for precedent and authority for
everything, led English lawyers back to classical and Christian antiquity. In
their hands what was at least partly no more than a maxim of popular wisdom
has been turned into a powerful support of freedom and justice.
JOHN

M.

KELLY

38. Biblical scenes are doubtful sources of authority for the status of audi alteram pattern
as a divinely inspired law. Certainly God "heard" Adam and Eve and Cain; but in St.
Matthew's account of the Last Judgment according to the words of Christ, salvation and
punishment are awarded before those being judged can say anything (Matt. 25. 31ff.). And,
as R. F. V. Heuston wrote (op. cit. supra note 3, at 172) in connection with Dr.
Bentley's Case, "it has . . . been noticed that the Biblical precedents on the point are conflicting, for at the lugubrious dinner-party recorded in Daniel V, at which the moving finger
interrupted the proceedings by writing on the wall 'mene, mene, tekel, upharsin' ('you
have been weighed in the balance and found wanting') the prophet does not indicate that
Belshazzar was given either summons, information of the nature of the complaint, or any
opportunity to answer."

